In September, Operation Chuong Duong struck at the same area, and in October the first of a series of operations called Wolf Pack lashed out at Doan-10. Viet Cong banners were raised along the waterways which read "Americans and Vietnamese Soldiers Who Come Here Will Die," and "We Kill Americans." River Assault Groups seldom went on combat missions. On 1 August 1965, operational responsibility for Market Time passed from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to General Westmoreland, and operational control from Commander Task Force 71, who had held this duty as a collateral function, to Commander Task Force 115, which was the new designation of the Commander of the Coastal Surveillance Force. In August new combined operations were launched against the base camp areas in the Nhon Trach "sanctuary" area outside of the Rung Sat, which was a much harder area for the Viet Cong to hide in. The Vietnamese Navy had grown to a force of 6,200 officers and men who operated 50 patrol ships and minecraft, and 208 amphibious and riverine craft. Few of these attacks managed to score hits, much less cause serious damage, but the enemy probably reaped considerable propaganda benefit from them and in the world press was credited with more strength than he actually possessed. Almost immediately the Annex began to outstrip the main complex itself in the number of visitors it attracted. Fish from the rivers and seas are an important staple in the Vietnamese diet. It was hoped that this move would increase the morale and the performance of the force. Early effort notwithstanding, the Viet Cong successfully mined one ship each in 1965 and 1966 (the SS Eastern Mariner and the SS Baton Rouge Victory respectively). By the middle of August the number had increased to 159 per day and the average size of the sampans was larger as heavier cargoes, mostly of wood, were moved to market. In October, ComUSMACV directed that a program be developed for an accelerated turnover of U. S. equipment, while the war continued, in order to make the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) as self-sufficient as possible. As in the past, we will honour those who served in the RCN, the Royal Canadian Air Force, and the Canadian Merchant Navy during the Second World War's Battle of the Atlantic, as well as the Korean War. By early February 1970 the Vietnamese Navy operated more than 50 per cent of the boats in the Rung Sat. English language leaflets were floated to the MATSB on tiny wooden rafts. They are attached to nearly every Vietnamese naval unit. The change of command took place on 10 May 1965. They performed valuable service but, like our Victory and Liberty merchant ships, it is doubtful how much additional service life is left in them. Lieutenant Commander Rodgers reported the sighting his counterpart, Lieutenant Commander Thoai, Vietnamese Navy, the Second Coastal Zone Commander, and arranged for an aircraft to investigate. Personal possessions representing the savings of a lifetime were hawked fruitlessly from door to door. By the fall of 1965, U. S. Navy units in Vietnam included: (1) the Marines in I Corps; (2) Navy support personnel under ComPhibPacs command at Da Nang and Chu Lai (on 1 October Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, was established under ComUSMACVs operational control and PhibPac support terminated); (3) Construction Battalions in I Corps and Seabee Teams throughout the country who also worked under the Military Assistance Command Vietnam; (4) the Officer in Charge of Construction and his organization; (5) the Naval Advisory Group; (6) the Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon (whose responsibilities were being phased out and taken over by the U. S. Army); (7) the Military Sea Transportation Service Office, Vietnam; and (8) numerous smaller activities. The following sections Historical Note, Scope and Content Notes, and Arrangement and Description were written by the collections original processors, Dr. Oscar Fitzgerald and Mrs. Sharyn Walker, on 13 December 1974. In recognition of the expanding U. S. role, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) was established in February 1962, and the Headquarters Support Activity was commissioned on 1 July. The enemy suffered 21 casualties and the loss of 380 weapons. Individual aspects of the U. S. Navy involvement in the war in Vietnam are discussed in previous Naval Review essays listed below as well as those in this edition. Captain Chon brought dynamic leadership, a new sense of purpose, and, perhaps most important, a period of much needed command stability to the Vietnamese Navy. The operation achieved immediate and striking success in its objective of easing pressure on the Long Tau shipping channel. Vietnam: Naval Advisory Group Vietnam: Naval Forces Vietnam (NAVFORV) Lessons Learned and End of Tour Reports Vietnam: Navy Research and Development Unit (NRDUV) Vietnam Operational. By the summer of 1966, nearly 50 per cent of the senior officers of the Navy were either out of the country or assigned to non-Navy duties in the country. "Application of Doctrine; Victory at Van Tuong Village, by Brigadier General O. F. Peatross, U. S. Marine Corps, in Naval Review 1967. Furthermore, a large percentage of the Vietnamese Navy was recruited from relatively well-to-do city populations who preferred the smaller risks of that service to those offered by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). When President Diem was overthrown, Captain Quyen, who was closely associated with the fallen President, and who had been instrumental in defeating several previously attempted coups, was himself murdered by a subordinate officer sympathetic to the incoming regime. In following months additional equipment was transferred to the Vietnamese Navy, primarily patrol craft, and accelerated training of both officers and enlisted men began; some of it in schools in the United States. The first permanent United States naval presence in Vietnam was established in August 1950, soon after the outbreak of the Korean War, when the Navy Section of Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indo china, was formed in Saigon with Commander James B. Cannon, U. S. Navy, and seven officers and men. Certain small increases had been made in the Sea Forces, however, and overall strength had grown to about 3,500 officers and men. In a series of graduated increases, the Junk Force was authorized an increase to 644 motorized junks less than two years later. They permitted the enemy to fire from relatively safe positions, well back from the river bank. There was always the danger that one of his attacks might succeed in sinking a large ship in the deep water channel, thereby disrupting the flow of supplies to Saigon. TWS is the largest online community of Veterans existing today and is a powerful Veteran locator. In April the operation expanded rapidly. Assistance was provided, however, by the First Australian Task Force and by the Royal Thai Army Volunteers. Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. Young officers and petty officers were assigned staggering responsibilities in this war and they shouldered them well. Market Time operations were then already in their twentieth week. Because of this expansion, the commanding general, General Joseph Warren Stilwell Jr. late in 1963 proposed that the name of the support group be changed to U.S. Army Support Command, Vietnam. Vice Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, Commander, U.S. Naval Support Activity Saigon or NSA Saigon was a United States Navy logistics support organization located in Saigon, South Vietnam active from May 1966 to June 1972. 7 In this sense "pacify" means: establishing control over the people who live on the banks, ending Viet Cong tax extortion, denying the waterways to enemy use, while at the same time, restoring the use of the waterways to friendly civilian and military use. Maximum use was made of SEAL, EOD, and UDT men. Captain (now Commodore) Tran Van Chon was named to the top Navy post on 31 October 1966, a move that took the Naval Advisory Group completely by surprise, since he had been "exiled for so long (five years). The Naval Advisory Group (NAG) of MACV assumed the responsibilities of the old Naval Section. Air strikes were called in, and after the third strike the ship was awash in shallow water, resting on her port side. Vietnamese ground commanders, and some of their American advisors, thought that such a base would be virtually indefensible. The 5th Special Forces Group was also established in-country by 1965. The proposal was thoroughly discussed at ComNavForV headquarters. It is a bitter pill for a whole generation of American "nation builders to swallow, but the brutal fact is that no Vietnamese Government until possibly the present one inspired in its people the loyalty, the unhesitating support, the patriotism and spirit of self-sacrifice essential to the welding of an effective defense force. The advisory effort, meanwhile, grew rapidly. Numerous bunkers and fortifications were thrown up, and solidly constructed barricades appeared across the more important waterways in an all-out Viet Cong effort to end the Swift boat raids. The Navy has approximately 500 such advisors in-country; their numbers are almost equally divided between officers and enlisted personnel. . In IV Corps Tactical Zone, this situation would plague Sea Lords operations from beginning to end. USMC Advisory Team Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ), Naval Advisory Group PCF PRU RAC RAG . [9]:18, The DAO was established as a subsidiary command of MACV and remained under the command of commander of MACV until the deactivation of MACV on 27 March 1973. It was decided, therefore, to shift to a standard family of small arms, using the same caliber of ammunition, and provide more modern supporting weapons. In the United States, "Project Buddy Base was launched to encourage U. S. Navy bases to provide equipment, material, encouragement and advice to Vietnamese Navy bases in the overall effort to raise the standard of living of VNN personnel and their dependents. Anyone know what patch this is? From Vietnam (USN). - Reddit There was a tendency on our part, based largely upon the observations of our naval advisors, to discount the effectiveness of VNN patrols, but force levels were not determined on the supposition that we would be doing the job alone. Day and night, hundreds of thousands of porters and young volunteers crossed passes and forded rivers in spite of enemy planes and delayed-action bombs. As was proven time and time again in Brown Water Nan operations in Vietnam, cooperation with trained and aggressive ground forces was the real key to success. The task force was activated on 24 February with headquarters at Tan My, under the operational control of Commanding General, III MAF. This added to the commands existing security vulnerabilities and communications difficulties. That afternoon, additional caches were uncovered. Finally, it was recommended that an extensive river patrol be established, with 120 river patrol craft operating from LSTs anchored off the mouths of the major rivers. On 21 February 1965, the Commander of the U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam requested the Commander-in-Chief Pacific and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet to send representatives to Saigon to plan a combined U. S.-Vietnamese Navy patrol effort. The river hamlets, for all their bogs and sloughs of mud, were alive with activity and sparkled with the laughter of children. "[8]:270, The air-conditioned structure of two-story prefabricated buildings, a little more than a third the size of its Washington namesake, included twelve acres of enclosed office space. On their return from market they brought potable water, rice, cloth, beer, and other staples. The senior military officer on this Mission was Major General Graves B. Erskine, U. S. Marine Corps, and the naval officers attached were Captain Mervin Halstead and Commander Ralph J. Michels. Naval advisors complained that their advice was frequently not taken, that new equipment and military supplies were not being used effectively. Allied sweeps along the Long Tau in this period were also occasionally uncovering 107 mm. There was a general reluctance within the Sea Forces to maintain active patrols. The Navy helicopter gunships, Seawolves, would provide support for Sea Lords in much the same way that they were supporting Game Warden and Mobile Riverine Force operations. More than 5000 landings were recorded in the first year of operations from the single-spot helo deck of the USS Benewah alone. Efforts at population and resources control should concentrate, they argued, in areas where the population was heavier and the resources greater than they were in the uninviting barrens of the Nam Can. The records in this collection were collected at the naval headquarters in Saigon by naval officers who acted as historians and were assigned to the staff. In July 1965, in response to the growing size of U.S. Army forces in the country, United States Army Vietnam was established, and both the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division as well as the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, deployed from the United States. Citation 26 - The Mobile Riverine Force Association - MRFA It took a great deal of persuasion and strong representations at the highest level, before the shotgun wedding was brought off. [6]:15, Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV) also controlled the Naval Support Activity Saigon (NSA Saigon), which supplied naval forces in the II, III and IV Corps areas. Embarked were 10 PBRS, a helicopter fire team, and two Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles (PACVs). Finally, the Report indicated that U. S. Navy forces might have to ' be deployed in the Delta rivers to stop Communist infiltration, thus anticipating later Game Warden operations. The old city was declared a free fire zone and became in effect a dumping ground for bombs and other air ordnance that could not be conveniently expended elsewhere in the Delta.